Health plan fiduciary issues have taken on increased urgency following a new wave of Employee Retirement Income Security Act class action lawsuits filed by plaintiffs’ firms. Sarah Raaii and Alden Bianchi recently joined the Moving to Value Alliance, a healthcare nonprofit, for a podcast episode focused on how group health plan sponsors and third-party service providers to group health plans can comply with the new fiduciary requirements enacted under the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 (CAA). They also discussed what health plan fiduciaries can do to ensure they fulfill their responsibilities to beneficiaries.
One year on from the end of the COVID-19 public health emergency, the Medicare restrictions on telehealth that Congress waived to allow for and expand the use of telehealth and other forms of virtual care are set to expire. Congress has already acted twice to extend the waivers, most recently in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, which extended them until the end of this calendar year. Thus, starting on January 1, 2025, these waivers will disappear without further Congressional action. The uncertainty about whether Congress will again extend the telehealth waivers (and for how long) will create numerous questions and cause confusion for health plans, patients and providers.
To adapt to the evolving healthcare landscape, health systems are seeking to identify alternatives to their traditional hospital-centric models and shift towards patient-centered care delivery. As a result, provider-sponsored health plans (PSHPs) are gaining traction as a potential framework for health systems to curate care delivery in the newly decentralized model of healthcare.
In this article, Brad Dennis and Gary Scott Davis explore the challenges facing the hospital-centric model, the reemergence of PSHPs and the advantages of integrating healthcare delivery and insurance functions in a PSHP-based model.
A question in response to last week’s post on self-funding of employer group health plans assumed that stop-loss coverage under a level-funded plan could be provided under a group captive medical captive. However, it cannot (at least not without first obtaining a prohibited transaction exemption from the US Department of Labor (DOL)). While group medical stop-loss coverage can be structured to avoid the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) prohibited transaction rules by scrupulously avoiding contact with ERISA plan assets in the plan’s stop-loss layer, it is not possible to prevent such contact in level-funded products.
The early years of group captives saw no shortage of handwringing over fundamental compliance issues. For example: Are group captives multiple employer welfare arrangements (MEWAs) (and should they be regulated as such)? To what extent are states free to constrain or restrain their operation? And which state insurance licensing laws apply?
For the most part, these and other compliance-related questions have been answered, if not completely, then at least substantially so. There is now broad agreement that the group medical stop-loss captive rests on a sound legal and regulatory foundation, which we explained at length in our Special Report. When properly structured, they are not MEWAs; states are free to regulate the stop-loss policy, and the fronting carrier must be licensed in each state in which the captive operates (i.e., where plan participants reside). Critical to their operation, however, is that the group medical stop-loss captive itself does not traffic in plan assets. This means that participant contributions, which are always plan assets, must never be applied to the purchase of stop-loss coverage.
The treatment of stop loss premiums, and their status as plan assets, are set out in two DOL Advisory Opinions:
Advisory Opinion 92-02
A stop-loss insurance policy purchased by an employer sponsoring a self-insured welfare benefit plan to which employees did not contribute is not an asset of the plan if certain conditions are satisfied. These conditions include that the insurance proceeds from the policies are payable only to the plan sponsor, which is the named insured under the policy, and no representations are made that the policy will be used to pay benefits.
Advisory Opinion 2015-02A
Where a stop-loss policy is purchased by a plan that includes participant contributions, the stop-loss policy would not be a plan asset if the facts surrounding the purchase of the stop-loss policy satisfies Advisory Opinion 92-02 and if the employer puts in place an accounting system that ensures that the payment of premiums for the stop-loss policy includes no employee contributions. Also, the stop-loss policy must reimburse the plan sponsor only if the plan sponsor pays claims under the plans from its own assets so that the plan sponsor will never receive any reimbursement from the insurer for claim amounts paid with participant contributions.
In the above-cited Special Report, we provided the following example of how an employer might comply where, as is typically the case, the [...]
In December 2023, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) adopted a Model Bulletin on the Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) Systems by Insurers. The model bulletin reminds insurance carriers that they must comply with all applicable insurance laws and regulations (e.g., prohibitions against unfair trade practices) when making decisions that impact consumers, including when those decisions are made or supported by advanced technologies, such as AI systems. To date, 11 states have adopted the model bulletin, thereby applying the standards to insurers that operate in the states.
In a recent article in Managed Healthcare Executive, Peter Wehrwein examines the trend of self-funding of group health benefits by smaller employers who used to depend mainly or entirely on fully insured programs.
The shift to self-funding, the article explains, is grounded in the Employee Retirement Income Security (ERISA), which exempts self-funded plans from state health insurance mandates, and in the Affordable Care Act, which strictly regulates small group and individual health insurance policies. Wehrwein presents the issues from the perspective of state and federal policymakers and regulators, which the article characterizes as “worrisome.” But what of the perspective of small employers?
Healthcare costs are rising at rates that are well in excess of the growth of real gross domestic product. This appears unsustainable, but these costs nevertheless keep climbing inexorably. For employers, the pressure to do something is compelling.
The article claims that self-funding is more expensive than fully insured coverage. But compared to what fully insured coverage, exactly? By definition, many small employers can only purchase coverage in the small-group market. This is, however, the very market these same employers are fleeing, and they are doing so precisely because it is too expensive. Indeed, the prohibitive cost of small-group market coverage is why individual coverage Health Reimbursement Arrangements have failed to gain widespread acceptance, particularly in large urban environments.
Wehrwein correctly identifies two options for self-funding: group medical captives and level funding, both of which he views as problematic. Small employers appear to disagree, however, based on their actions. In their view, these options instead represent viable options in their quest to provide competitive group health coverage to their employees. The two options for self-funding identified in the article are fundamentally different solutions that are appropriate for different cohorts of small employers.
Group Medical Captives (50 – 200 Covered Lives)
The term “captive” insurer traditionally referred to a “single parent” captive, which is a subsidiary of an operating company/parent that insures the risks of the operating company/parent and in some instances its affiliates. Historically, single-parent captives insured property and casualty risks and workers’ compensation, but they have more recently been pressed into service to cover employee welfare plan risks.
A group captive allows a group of unrelated employers to form a collective insurance company to manage some portions of their risks. Where, as is the case here, the risk is most often medical stop-loss coverage, the arrangement is referred to colloquially as a “medical stop-loss group captive.” For an extended discussion of medical stop-loss group captive funding arrangements and their accompanying legal and regulatory issues, please see our Special Report.
There is some debate over what size employer might most benefit from participation in a medical stop-loss group captive. While the conventional wisdom is that 200 covered lives is the sweet spot, credible estimates go as low as 50 covered lives. Whatever the appropriate number, medical stop-loss captives can in the right circumstances offer substantial savings when compared to fully insured coverage. [...]
May 11, 2024, marked one year since the end of the COVID-19 public health emergency (PHE), and not much has changed in Medicare telehealth policy. We are still operating under temporary waivers and flexibilities and, as a result, many pandemic-era virtual care policies are facing a cliff on December 31, 2024. This looms large during a contentious election year in which legislating has grown increasingly difficult.
This +Insight explores the virtual care policy landscape one year after the end of the PHE, and describes the actions Congress and federal agencies must take for such pandemic-era policies to continue.
Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, age or disability, or any combination thereof, in a health program or activity, any part of which is receiving federal financial assistance. On May 6, 2024, the US Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights (OCR) issued final regulations under Section 1557. For an overview of these regulations, please see our post available here.
In a recent post, we reported that the final regulations unambiguously prohibit categorical coverage exclusions or limitations for health services related to gender transition or other gender-affirming care. This, we predicted, is likely to result in a showdown involving the two dozen or so state laws that, among other things, limit gender-affirming care access. In this post, we take up the final regulations’ treatment of pregnancy and abortion. While a similar showdown over abortion is possible, it is (for the reasons set out below) less likely.
Rather than establish protected characteristics, Section 1557 instead cross-references four other civil rights statutes to define what discrimination is prohibited. These include Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Notably, three of the cross-references (including Title IX) also contain the abbreviation “et seq.,” which captures the balance of the provisions constituting a given law.
An ongoing source of friction involving ACA Section 1557 is the cross-reference to the “religious exemption” in Title IX. This exemption permits conduct by a religiously controlled educational institution that might otherwise violate the statute’s requirements when the institution acts for a religious reason and compliance with the statute would conflict with a religious tenet. A subsequent amendment clarified that Title IX must be construed to neither require nor prohibit any person or entity to provide abortion-related benefits or services. This is referred to as “abortion neutrality.” The final regulations do not incorporate Title IX’s religious exemption or its abortion neutrality provision.
The final regulations define discrimination “on the basis of sex” to include pregnancy or related conditions. How this squares with abortion is addressed at some length in the preamble and the regulation itself:
The decision not to import the Title IX religious exception does not compel any individual provider or covered entity with religious- or conscience-based objections to provide abortion or any other care to the extent doing so would conflict with a sincerely held belief.
The ACA’s respect for federal laws applies. That law includes robust protections regarding conscience protection, willingness or refusal to provide abortion, and discrimination on the basis of the willingness or refusal “to provide, pay for, cover, or refer for abortion or to provide or participate in training to provide abortion.’’ In addition, “[i]nsofar as the application of any requirement under this part would violate applicable Federal protections for religious [...]
On April 26, 2024, the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued a final rule (press release, fact sheet, FAQs) reinterpreting Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, age or disability, or any combination thereof, in a health program or activity, any part of which is receiving federal financial assistance. The rule, which has staggered effectivity dates starting on July 5, 2024, largely finalizes the policies as proposed in HHS’s August 2022 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, including clarifying protections for gender-affirming care, as provided by group health plans, carriers and third-party administrators under administrative-services-only (ASO) arrangements.
Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, age or disability, or any combination thereof, in a health program or activity, any part of which is receiving federal financial assistance.
On May 6, 2024, the US Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights (OCR) and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services published final regulations (final regulations) implementing Section 1557 (Our summary and overview of the final regulations is available here.) Entities that are subject to Section 1557 (covered entities) include hospitals, health clinics, health insurance issuers, state Medicaid agencies and community health centers. While group health plans are not themselves covered entities unless they receive federal financial assistance (e.g., certain Medicare Part D programs and Employer Group Waiver Plans), carriers that provide administrative services to group health plans may themselves be covered entities if they receive federal financial assistance (e.g., by selling Medicare Advantage products).
Reversing prior law, the final regulations unambiguously prohibit categorical coverage exclusions or limitations for health services related to gender transition or other gender-affirming care. OCR finds support for this change in the US Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, which held that Title VII of the Equal Employment Act prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual on the basis of sexual orientation. But prohibiting categorical coverage exclusions is not the same thing as requiring covered entities to provide access to gender-affirming care under all circumstances. There are limits; covered entities must not:
[D]eny or limit services based on gender identity or sex assigned at birth, adopt any policy of treating individuals differently on the basis of sex, including to the extent it prevents an individual from engaging in a health program or activity consistent with the individual’s gender identity, or deny or limit services sought for gender transition or other gender-affirming care based on sex assigned at birth or gender identity.
The provision would outlaw blanket bans on both gender-affirming care itself and on specific gender-affirming procedures (like facial feminization surgery). But it would also prohibit plans or carriers that qualify as covered entities from covering breast reconstruction for cancer treatment, or hormones to treat post-menopause symptoms, without also covering these procedures to treat gender dysphoria.
The final regulations do not interfere with individualized clinical judgment about the appropriate course of care for a patient. (The preamble makes further claims that OCR has a general practice of deferring to a clinician’s judgment about whether a particular service is medically appropriate for an individual, or whether the clinician has the appropriate expertise to provide care.) A provider’s belief that gender transition or other gender-affirming care can never be beneficial, or its compliance with a state or local law that reflects a similar judgment, is not a sufficient basis for a judgment that a health service is never clinically appropriate, however.
The 2016 final Section 1557 regulations were successfully challenged in Franciscan Alliance v. Burwell (N.D. [...]
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